बेबाक · Editorial
From Somalia to Katchatheevu, India's Maritime Reach Must Also Protect Its Own Fishermen
Indian Navy and Coast Guard rescues show real capability at sea. That capability must reach the coastal citizen who has least protection: the small fisherman.
A fortnight at sea
Over a few weeks, India's maritime services have shown competence across a wide stretch of ocean. The Indian Navy rescued 20 Iranian crew members from the hijacked fishing vessel Azini off Somalia after an operation of more than 48 hours, with marine commandos and IAF aircraft support, and no casualties. In a swift maritime search and rescue operation, the Indian Coast Guard rescued 20 crew members from the 179.90-metre bulk carrier MV Sigma Pearl after it ran aground off the Andhra Pradesh coast. In Odisha, a Navy helicopter joined the search for 12 people still missing after landslides triggered by Cyclone Arnab killed four. This is serious work, done well, and it deserves recognition.
Two kinds of sea power
The same period showed the expensive side of sea power. The Rafale Marine fighter landed on INS Vikrant for the first time, and trials are under way in Goa to adapt the aircraft to the carrier's ski-jump launch and recovery systems. The Navy has contracted 26 of these jets, which officials say will arrive by the end of 2028 or early 2029. At Visakhapatnam, the 33rd Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise, SIMBEX-2026, hosted by the Indian Navy, ended on 26 October. Near Katchatheevu, the picture was different. The Sri Lankan Navy detained seven fishermen from Rameswaram and Thangachimadam while they were fishing, and fishermen's associations condemned the arrests and asked the Centre and the Tamil Nadu government to secure their release. The real question is whether India's growing naval reach also protects the Indians most exposed at sea.
The case on each side
The strongest case for carriers, fighters and exercises is clear. The Indian Ocean is crowded with competing interests. Deterrence requires platforms that take years to build, and partners such as Singapore value a navy that can operate far from home. The Azini rescue shows that this reach also serves humanitarian ends. The strongest case from the coast is just as clear. A fisherman in Rameswaram gains little from a ski-jump trial in Goa if his boat can be seized in the waters where he earns his living. Disaster-hit districts in Odisha need helicopters during cyclone season, not in 2029. Both arguments are sound, and neither alone tells the whole story.
What the record shows
The record suggests that capability is not the problem. The Navy can sustain an operation of more than 48 hours far from Indian shores. The Coast Guard can reach a grounded bulk carrier swiftly. The Navy has already joined the search effort in cyclone-hit Odisha. The weakness lies elsewhere: in the diplomatic and civilian arrangements around the sea. The Katchatheevu detentions are not a failure of seamanship. They point to a livelihood question that the fishermen's own associations say demands the attention of both the Centre and the state. A country that operates confidently in the waters off Somalia cannot treat the detention of its own fishermen as a minor local matter.
Verdict
India has good reason to take pride in its maritime services, and this fortnight shows that the pride is earned. But maritime strength is measured by how secure the most vulnerable coastal citizen is, not only by fleet size. A navy that can recover twenty foreign sailors off Somalia should also be the basis of a state that can bring seven of its own fishermen home from Katchatheevu. Strategic platforms and humanitarian reach are not competing priorities. They belong to one national duty, and the duty is incomplete while Indian fishermen near Katchatheevu remain at risk of detention.
The way forward
Three steps are achievable. First, the Ministry of External Affairs should work with Colombo on a time-bound humanitarian protocol that separates detained fishermen's release from disputes over boats and fishing grounds, with progress reported publicly and the Tamil Nadu government consulted at each stage. Second, the Navy, the Coast Guard and the disaster authorities of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh should publish joint after-action reviews of the Cyclone Arnab response, so lessons become standard procedure. Third, while the Navy waits for the Rafale Marine fleet, the services' rescue capacity should be funded as core national security, not treated as an extra.
A navy that can recover twenty foreign sailors off Somalia should also be the basis of a state that can bring seven of its own fishermen home from Katchatheevu.
What this editorial rests on
Drawn from our live multi-newsroom feed — read the reporting at source.
An editorial is the considered opinion of the FarziUPSC desk, argued from the sourced reporting above and written under our published persona, बेबाक. We name institutions, not parties. If we are wrong, we will say so. How we work →